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We are pleased to be able to present, in this third volume of the Advances in Industrial and Labor 
Relations series, some original, important, and in some cases provocative research on industrial relations 
regulation, bargaining theory, progressive discipline, and occupational influences on unionism. In what 
follows we will briefly review each of the papers in the volume and pinpoint what we believe to be the 
major contributions each makes to the advancement of research in industrial relations. Where relevant, we 
will also mention questions left unresolved by the research at hand and potential directions for future 
research on the subjects under study. 
 The first half of this volume is devoted to studies of the regulation of industrial relations. Since 
the early 1960s, almost half of all federal regulatory statutes (and perhaps as large a proportion of state 
statutes) have dealt with the regulation of human resources, labor markets, and labor relations. 1 
Unfortunately, only very limited inquiry into the effects of these regulations has been conducted. 
 We say “unfortunately” because we believe that a major debate about the deregulation of human 
resources, labor markets, and labor relations is soon likely to take place in the United States—indeed, it 
appears already to have begun 2—and yet that debate is unlikely to be informed by a substantial body of 
scholarly work that can help public policy makers and the citizenry assess the existing regulations. 
Fortunately, however, a few studies of the effects of regulation on labor relations and labor markets have 
recently been conducted, and four of these are presented here. 
HENDRICKS 
Of the four, Wallace Hendricks’s paper is perhaps the most fundamentally regulatory in its focus: 
it assesses the effects of industry and product market regulation on the labor market and on labor-
management relations. After reviewing several different types of industry regulations, Hendricks 
concludes that all such regulation reduces competition, increases unionization, and, in a similar fashion, 
increases wages. The common regulatory effect is to limit entry into certain industries and sectors, 
making product and labor market demands more inelastic than they would be otherwise. Correspondingly, 
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deregulation brings about more elastic product and labor market demands and facilitates the entry of new 
firms into the marketplace. The fact that union officials argued strenuously against the recent deregulation 
of airlines, trucking, and, to a lesser extent, telecommunications suggests that they were well aware of the 
gains achieved under regulation and of the threats to previously negotiated pay levels, work rules, and, 
indeed, union jobs that were posed by deregulation of these industries. 
 Their fears were well justified, as Hendricks clearly shows. The deregulation of the airline 
industry in the late 1970s was soon accompanied by major wage reductions, pressures for more flexible 
work rules, and numerous bargaining concessions by unions. The entry of new carriers, including many 
nonunion carriers, was swift and occurred on a large scale. That so powerful a union as the Air Line Pilots 
Association has recently been party to a number of concessionary labor contracts attests to the serious 
impact of deregulation on collective bargaining in the airline industry. 3 
 Similarly, in trucking, substantial evidence has accumulated to show that in the early post-
deregulation period, teamster wages were frozen or reduced; cost-of-living adjustments were frozen, 
reduced, or eliminated; and employment increasingly shifted to the nonunion sector. According to 
Hendricks, significant departures from the National Master Freight Agreement in trucking were instituted 
in the early 1980s, and unemployment among Teamsters rose dramatically. 
 In telecommunications, the deregulation scenario was somewhat different from that in the airlines 
and trucking industries. Hendricks points out that the Communication Workers of America (CWA) tended 
to favor, not oppose, industry deregulation, in large part because of the union’s historical success in 
negotiating employment security provisions. The CWA leadership apparently judged the potential for 
new organizing opportunities to exceed the threats to current union members’ wages, benefits, and jobs 
that were posed by deregulation. A recent analysis by Koch, Lewin, and Sockell of portending changes in 
bargaining structure under the AT&T divestiture arrangement suggests, however, that the CWA may have 
been overly optimistic about the benefits its members would realize under deregulation of their industry. 4 
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 In reviewing and assessing the effects of deregulation on industrial relations in these industries, 
Hendricks raises two interesting public policy questions. First, should workers whose pay, benefits, and 
working conditions are lowered or otherwise negatively affected by deregulation be compensated in some 
way for their losses? Second, if, under deregulation, the market distortions that led policy makers to 
institute the regulation in the first place remain in existence, should the deregulation effort be abandoned? 
These are, of course, difficult questions to answer. Nevertheless, by raising them, Hendricks alerts us to 
the fact that the matter of individual (private) versus social (public) costs is as relevant a consideration to 
the regulation and deregulation of industrial relations as to the economy more broadly. 
BLOCK AND WOLKINSON 
 Richard Block and Benjamin Wolkinson’s paper examines the regulation of private sector labor-
management relations in the United States by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, as amended, 
principally, by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. Their analysis of the act (the term is used here 
to refer to the Wagner Act and all of its subsequent amendments) focuses on representation election 
processing time, the effects of employer and union campaigns on representation election outcomes, and 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and court rulings on employer and union campaign behavior. 
 The authors begin by analyzing representation election data for the 1940- 81 period, about which 
they draw two major conclusions. First, there is no evidence that the time between the filing of an election 
petition and the board’s actual holding of the election has lengthened over time or that it is greater than it 
“ought to be’’; and second, election delay may not be the widely used employer weapon that unions 
believe it to be. These conclusions are provocative because they run counter to the views of numerous (for 
the most part, legal) scholars and labor-management practitioners. 5 
 Nevertheless, Block and Wolkinson do show that the union success rate in representation 
elections has declined steadily, if irregularly, since the early 1940s; and they judge this decline to have 
resulted from a combination of expanded employer freedoms and increasing restrictions on union 
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behavior in the conduct of election campaigns. To support this view, the authors do not cite or show a 
pattern of increasingly pro-employer decisions on the part of the NLRB. To the contrary, and unlike some 
other analysts, 6 they state that no such tilt has characterized board decisions, at least up to the early 
1980s. Rather, it has been the courts—the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court—that have 
supported expanded employer freedoms and restricted union freedoms in the conduct of election 
campaigns. 
 Testing this hypothesis, Block and Wolkinson review numerous court decisions in labor cases 
over roughly a 40-year period and conclude that “the courts have given greater deference to the property 
rights of the employer than has the board in cases in which legitimate union interests and legitimate 
employer interests were in conflict.” A second hypothesis— namely, the more the courts of appeals are 
involved in deciding labor cases, the more the board will attempt to adjust its interpretations of the NLRA 
to agree with those of the courts—is judged by the authors not to have been supported by their review and 
analysis of board and court decisions. Block and Wolkinson are far from sanguine about their first 
conclusion; they urge the industrial relations community to engage in a major debate over the propriety of 
a national labor-relations policy that, at present and in its actual enforcement, strongly favors employer 
over union interests. 
 Some additional perspective on this provocative and undoubtedly controversial view of the 
regulation of private sector labor-management relations may be gained by recognizing that employer or, 
more pointedly, private interests have long been favored by the judiciary in cases of clashes with other, 
more intangible property interests. 7 Further, the NLRA contains many other sections and provisions than 
those examined by Block and Wolkinson, and these, too, deserve careful study if a full assessment of U.S. 
labor law is to be made. Again, an important limitation on any such assessment, as identified by Delaney, 
Lewin, and Sockell in their recent review of 50 years of research on the act, is that many of the act’s 
provisions have been subject to little or no systematic empirical inquiry. 8 Finally, if one accepts Block 
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and Wolkinson’s main conclusions, a logical policy recommendation is to repeal the NLRA—a position 
that has been forcefully advocated by some prominent labor leaders. 9 If such a recommendation were to 
be seriously debated, if not adopted, the age-old question of freedom through the market versus freedom 
from the market would once again, as in the 1930s, become central to the debate. 10 Block and 
Wolkinson’s analysis should help to inform that debate. 
DELANEY, FEUILLE, AND HENDRICKS 
 In their paper on interest arbitration in municipal police departments, Delaney, Feuille, and 
Hendricks review and extend their analysis of findings from their larger study of police collective 
bargaining. 11 Treating interest arbitration as a form of regulation, they ask, and attempt to answer, the 
question: What are the benefits and costs of such regulation? 
 According to the authors the principal benefits of interest arbitration are that it (1) reduces strikes 
by covered employees, thereby serving the public interest; (2) encourages covered employees to unionize 
for the purpose of collective bargaining, which is consistent with the aims of public sector labor relations 
and bargaining policies; and (3) is associated with, though does not necessarily cause, higher salaries and 
fringe benefits and better working conditions for police. (The authors recognize that not all scholars or 
practitioners would agree that the second and third items are benefits of regulation.) The costs of interest 
arbitration as a form of regulation are that it (1) may inhibit representative government by enabling public 
and union officials to avoid making certain decisions about wages and other employment conditions, 
thereby allowing them to evade some of the responsibilities they were elected carry out; (2) may inhibit 
the use of the collective bargaining process to resolve union-management differences; and (3) may alter 
the mix of employees hired to deliver police services and increase the costs of delivering those services. 
 The authors usefully point out that a precise valuation of these various costs and benefits cannot 
easily be determined; rather, individual values and judgments must be the basis for calculating a number 
of the costs and benefits. For example; those who highly value a reduction in public employee strikes 
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would probably judge the benefits of interest arbitration to outweigh its costs, whereas those who are 
more concerned with the increased cost of providing police service that results from interest arbitration 
would reach the opposite judgment. 
 This brief summary of the principal findings and public policy conclusions of Delaney, Feuille, 
and Hendricks hardly does justice to the detailed empirical analysis performed in their study. The authors’ 
ordinary- and generalized-least-squares regression analyses show, for example, that the availability of 
interest arbitration is significantly and positively associated with higher police salaries (though not 
uniformly across states), whereas the actual use of interest arbitration is not. In addition, estimates of the 
effects of collective bargaining on police salaries and other terms and conditions of employment are lower 
when the authors control for arbitration variables. The authors also find intertemporal changes in the 
effects of bargaining on the minimum and maximum salaries of police; specifically, the bargaining effect 
peaked in the late 1970s and declined thereafter through the early 1980s. 
 In reaching these and many other conclusions, Delaney, Feuille, and Hendricks have assembled 
the most comprehensive data set yet available concerning police labor relations and collective bargaining. 
This point is important because it underscores both the importance and the limitations of the available 
data in estimating the effects and in judging the costs and benefits of collective bargaining and interest 
arbitration in the public sector as a whole. Although it is not generally recognized, the adoption of one or 
another form of collective bargaining legislation for public employees by 38 U.S. states during the past 25 
years represents perhaps the most widespread regulatory development in the field of industrial relations 
since the end of post-World War II. 12 In our judgment, Delaney, Feuille, and Hendricks properly call 
attention to the major data collection and assessment effort that is required if we are to make an informed 
judgment about the consequences of these regulations. Put differently, the authors would be the first to 
admit that their findings and conclusions are confined to police labor relations and may not be 
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representative of municipal services or municipal governments as a whole, let alone the entire 
governmental sector. 
LEONARD 
 Jonathan Leonard’s paper focuses in part on another major subset of industrial relations 
regulation, namely, employment discrimination. But rather than testing for the effects of federal and state 
anti-discrimination statutes, Leonard seeks to determine whether Hispanics, blacks, and women fare 
better or worse with respect to termination, new hire, and promotion rates in union than in nonunion 
manufacturing plants. Matching collective bargaining contract data for several hundred establishments 
and several hundred thousand workers in the state of California in the late 1970s with U.S. Department of 
Labor affirmative action review data, Leonard performs several regression analyses of gender and race 
differentials in personnel flows in union and nonunion plants. The regression estimates are made within a 
theoretical model of the demand for and supply of union and nonunion labor. 
 In brief, Leonard finds that Hispanics (California’s largest minority group), blacks, and women 
were not significantly more likely to suffer a termination or to fail to be hired or promoted in union than 
in nonunion plants during the period in question. He interprets these findings to mean that union seniority 
systems no longer cause the disproportionate layoffs of low seniority minorities and women that they 
once were assumed to cause; in fact, these systems may now protect relatively high-seniority minorities 
and women. 
 Leonard also estimates the effects of union status on the change in the employment shares of 
Hispanics, blacks, and women in California manufacturing establishments during the late 1970s. One 
important finding is that union status does not have a statistically significant effect on changes in minority 
and female employment shares. The most significant variable influencing these shares is total 
employment growth within a plant (whether union or nonunion); the higher the growth rate of total 
employment within a plant, the larger the increase in minority and female shares of employment. These 
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findings strongly suggest that economic forces are more significant than institutional forces (unionism 
and legislation) in the external and internal labor market success of minorities and women, and they 
parallel those of other scholars who have investigated this issue at the more macro level of analysis. 13 
 Other (earlier) portions of Leonard’s paper deal with union-nonunion differences in employment 
growth and employment variation over time in California manufacturing establishments. Leonard finds 
that during the late 1970s employment grew significantly more rapidly in nonunion than in union plants, a 
finding that is consistent with models in which unions raise wages and production costs and in which 
union plants are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis nonunion plants. For example, over “rolling” 
five-year periods between 1969 and 1981, employment grew by 17 percent in the nonunion plants but by 
only one percent in the unionized plants in Leonard’s sample. Moreover, the greater intertemporal 
variation in employment in the union than in the nonunion California plants is consistent with models in 
which wages are more rigid in the union than in the nonunion sector, and in which union plants are 
relatively more likely than nonunion plants to respond to product demand fluctuation by varying 
employment more than (or instead of) wages. Although the generalizability of research findings derived 
from data on single state is, of course, limited, Leonard’s empirical work represents a careful, balanced 
assessment of union effects on employment growth and on employment opportunities for minorities and 
women—an assessment that should be attempted for other states and regions in the nation. 
 The next two papers in this volume provide theoretical analyses of the bargaining process. 
Bargaining theory has been a topic of major interest in several disciplines, but each discipline has tended 
to emphasize different facets of the bargaining process. The first paper here is rooted in the tradition of 
work on the subject by economists and game theorists. The second paper grows out of the attempt by 
sociologists and industrial relations scholars to understand the nature of bargaining power. 
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CHAMPLIN AND BOGNANNO 
 The first paper, by Frederic C. Champlin and Mario F. Bognanno, has three fundamental 
objectives. First, the authors develop a “simple” model of bargaining behavior that is based on the well-
known work of Nash. 14 The model is a simple one in the sense that it can be understood by readers with 
little knowledge of mathematics and game theory. Second, the authors apply their basic model to previous 
work that has attempted to explain bargaining behavior in the presence of various compulsory arbitration 
schemes. Most of this previous work has been the province of economists, who have tried to understand 
the conditions that provide the parties with an incentive to bargain rather than to submit their disputes to 
arbitration. Third, the authors use their basic model to explain the circumstances under which bargaining 
is likely to lead to disagreement and conflict. Understanding the existence of “costly conflict” has always 
been a problem in economic theories of bargaining, which usually envision agreement as the parties’ only 
“rational” response. 
 In Champlin and Bognanno’s model each bargainer operates on the basis of a well-defined utility 
function, attempting to maximize his own utility. Each can make an accurate calculation of the “expected 
utility” he will obtain from a negotiated agreement and compare it to the expected utility he will obtain if 
there is disagreement, which in the authors’ model triggers the use of arbitration. “Since either side may 
unilaterally invoke arbitration,” the authors note, “each side may guarantee to itself an outcome that is no 
worse for it than the arbitration outcome. Thus, the conflict outcome—arbitration—is special because it is 
always available and because it establishes the minimally acceptable outcome for each side. Neither side 
will accept a negotiated settlement that is less in its favor than the arbitration award simply because it can 
always invoke arbitration.” 
 The three key concepts in the authors’ model are the “threat point,” which is represented by the 
expected utilities from arbitration that each party calculates for itself; the “superior set,” which is “the 
subset of the attainable utility set that is no less preferred by both parties than arbitration”; and the 
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“contract zone,” which is the collection of points in the superior set compared to which there are no other 
points in the superior set that both parties prefer (that is, the contract zone is the locus of Pareto- optimal 
outcomes). The authors then show that threat points within the attainable utility set (namely, “interior 
threat points”) generate superior sets, contract zones, and agreement, whereas threat points outside the 
attainable utility set eliminate the possibility of agreement, thus producing conflict. 
 Accordingly, the key to understanding the likelihood of agreement or disagreement in bargaining 
lies in identifying the factors that determine whether the parties have an interior threat point. Using this 
basic model, Champlin and Bognanno examine work by Stevens, 15 Farber and Katz, 16 Bloom, 17 Hirsch 
and Donn, 18 Schelling, 19 and Crawford 20 in an attempt to pinpoint the factors those scholars have 
postulated lead to a negotiated agreement or to conflict (arbitration). This previous work, Champlin and 
Bognanno demonstrate, can easily be accommodated within their own basic model. By postulating the 
key factors leading to arbitration or to agreement, each of the previous theorists attempted—at least 
implicitly—to identify the location of the threat point vis-a-vis the superior set and the contract zone. 
Each theorist, however, tended to focus on only one or two of the factors that Bognanno and Champlin 
believe determine the location of the threat point. By surveying the earlier literature, the authors are able 
to assemble a more comprehensive list of factors that explain the existence of conflict between rational 
bargainers. 
 Their model suggests a twofold classification of these factors: those that influence the location of 
the threat point, and those that influence the content of the attainable utility set. Among the several factors 
that affect the location of the threat point are each party’s beliefs about (or probability estimate of) how 
favorable to its interests an arbitration award will be, a factor stressed by Stevens and by Farber and Katz; 
the possibility that arbitrators may issue inferior (or unworkable) awards, a factor stressed by Stevens; the 
parties’ risk preferences, a factor emphasized by Stevens, Farber and Katz, and Bloom; and the exogenous 
costs of arbitration, a factor discussed by Bloom and by Hirsch and Donn. The factors that affect the 
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content of the attainable utility set are the exogenous costs of negotiation, first emphasized by Bloom, and 
the endogenous costs associated with “commitment” strategies, suggested by Schelling and elaborated by 
Crawford. 
 Thus, parties are more likely to use arbitration when they are optimistic about the arbitration 
award and pessimistic about the terms of a negotiated settlement; when they do not believe an arbitrator 
will issue an unworkable award; when they are risk averse and believe the arbitration alternative will be 
less risky than a negotiated settlement; when the “out of pocket" (or exogenous) costs of arbitration are 
lower than the comparable costs of negotiation; and when they might incur costs associated with 
“commitment” strategies that reduce the value of any negotiated settlement relative to the value of an 
arbitration award. 
 Champlin and Bognanno acknowledge the limitations of their model. For example, the model is 
not equipped to incorporate the effects of the parties’ lack of bargaining skill, lack of information, or 
other sources of misperceptions. Moreover, it is not easy to collect the kinds of statistical data needed to 
test the hypotheses generated by the model, a limitation shared by other economic theories of the 
bargaining process. 20 Nevertheless, because it integrates within a common framework much of 
economists’ previous work on bargaining incentives, the authors believe that their model provides “a 
broad foundation for improving our understanding of the effects of dispute resolution schemes on 
bargaining behavior.” 
LAWLER AND BACHARACH 
In the second paper on bargaining theory, Edward J. Lawler and Samuel B. Bacharach review and 
extend their earlier work on bargaining power. 22 For Lawler and Bacharach, bargaining power grows out 
of a party’s dependence on its opponent. That is, “the power of actor A is based on actor B’s dependence 
on the benefits that can be provided by A, while the power of actor B is based on A’s dependence on the 
benefits that can be provided by B.” Power-dependence theory further stipulates that an actor’s 
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dependence on an opponent is based on two conditions: the availability to the actor of alternative sources 
of outcomes and the degree of “commitment” by the actor to the outcomes at stake in bargaining. It 
should be noted that Lawler and Bacharach’s use of the term commitment differs from the use of that term 
by Schelling and by Crawford. By commitment, Lawler and Bacharach mean the “subjective importance 
the actor attaches to the outcomes at issue.” 
 Power-dependence theory treats a bargainer’s alternative outcome sources and his commitment as 
analytically distinct phenomena. The basic proposition of power-dependence theory is that an actor’s 
bargaining power should be greater the poorer the opponent’s alternative outcome sources and the greater 
the opponent’s commitment to the outcomes at stake. This conception of bargaining power, it might be 
noted, is fundamentally different from Chamberlain and Kuhn’s well-known formulation. 23 
 Lawler and Bacharach’s conception of bargaining power leads to several propositions that are not 
always intuitive. For example, if A’s dependence on B increases, B’s bargaining power increases. But an 
increase in A’s dependence on B does not necessarily mean that B’s dependence on A decreases. B’s 
bargaining power can therefore increase even while A’s bargaining power remains unchanged. It follows 
that total power in a relationship (the sum of A’s dependence on B and B’s dependence on A) can 
increase or decrease according to whether the parties’ mutual dependence on each other increases or 
decreases. Lawler and Bacharach are careful to distinguish total power from relative power (the ratio of 
A’s dependence on B to B’s dependence on A, or vice versa). As the authors point out, “It is important to 
recognize that the same degree of relative power can occur with different degrees of total power, and the 
same degree of total power may occur with different degrees of relative power.” 
In contrast to the concerns of economists, Lawler and Bacharach are not as interested in 
predicting the outcomes of bargaining as they are in specifying the conditions that will lead to a party 
gaining or losing bargaining power. The economist’s assumption that bargainers attempt to maximize 
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their outcomes (or utilities) in bargaining is discarded by Lawler and Bacharach in favor of the 
assumption that bargainers attempt to maximize their bargaining power. 
 The heart of Lawler and Bacharach’s paper is an examination of four intriguing “paradoxes” that 
grow logically out of power-dependence theory. The first is the notion that “power is based on giving.” 
To gain power, a party must make his opponent dependent on him. Party A’s dependence on party B is 
increased if B can provide benefits to A. The trick, of course, is for B to provide benefits to A that A 
values but B does not. Specifically, according to the authors, if a union wants to maximize its power over 
management in the long run, it should seek to provide benefits to management that are significantly 
greater than the prospective benefits management could obtain from alternative sources (such as nonunion 
workers). This paradox suggests that a union’s concessions in one round of contract negotiations may 
actually serve to increase the power it can wield in future contract rounds. 
 “To use power is to lose it,” according to Lawler and Bacharach. 24 This second paradox hinges 
on recognizing that the use of power inherently involves coercion. A party’s use of coercion has the effect 
of either increasing the benefits it receives from the opponent or decreasing the benefits it provides to the 
opponent. If a union reduces the benefits it supplies to an employer (for example, by striking), it reduces 
the dependence of the employer on the union and its members. And again, a reduction in the employer’s 
dependence on the union in turn reduces the union’s bargaining power. If a union increases the benefits it 
extracts from the employer (for example, by winning a very high wage increase), the union and its 
members’ dependence on the employer increases and, hence, the employer’s bargaining power increases. 
In either case, the use of coercion to win or withhold benefits undermines the union’s relative power vis-
a-vis the employer. “Coercion, therefore, may be a very useful strategy for achieving short-term benefits,” 
Lawler and Bacharach maintain, “but in a bargaining relationship that continues over time, it can have 
serious longer- term [deleterious] effects on an actor’s power.” 
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 The third paradox is that “power can have integrative effects on labor- management relations.” 
The authors explain, “If both labor and management rely on tactics that increase the other’s dependence, 
mutual dependence will grow. We argue that the growth of mutual dependence will increase the potential 
for a more cooperative, integrative bargaining relationship.” The irony here is that an increase in mutual 
dependence, in Lawler and Bacharach's scheme, is equivalent to an increase in the total power in the 
relationship. Thus, tactics designed to increase a party’s power, if matched by tactics designed by the 
opponent to increase its own power, can have the counterintuitive result of increasing the parties’ mutual 
dependence and hence of fostering cooperation. 
 The fourth and final paradox is that “inferior power can provide a tactical advantage.” If it is true, 
as Lawler and Bacharach postulate, that a party’s commitment to the outcomes at issue increases that 
party’s dependence on its opponent, then a highly committed party has inferior power. But the authors 
also maintain that a highly committed bargainer may be more motivated to expend more tactical effort to 
manipulate the opponent and thereby acquire the outcomes he values highly. Thus, “tactical effort” by a 
bargainer can overcome inferior power. Paradoxically, a party with high power may actually find itself 
yielding, at least in the short run, to an opponent whose high commitment undercuts its relative power. 
This possibility, according to the authors, underscores “the importance of placing the short-term aspects 
of bargaining in the context of the ongoing power struggle.” 
 Lawler and Bacharach conclude by noting that each of the four paradoxes illuminates how 
“tactical action within contract negotiations can have unintended effects on the ongoing power 
relationships.” One virtue of power- dependence theory, they submit, is that it raises such issues and 
provides general theoretical answers. 
 The papers by Champlin and Bognanno and by Lawler and Bacharach both deal with bargaining 
theory, but each is rooted in a different tradition. Each is concerned with different aspects of the 
bargaining relationship: bargaining outcomes, bargaining incentives, and the existence of conflict, in the 
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case of Champlin and Bognanno; and bargaining power, bargaining tactics, and the longer-term 
relationship between the parties, in the case of Lawler and Bacharach. Read in tandem, the two papers 
enrich our understanding of the bargaining process. What is still required, however, is additional work 
that advances the integration of the disparate approaches to bargaining theory. 
JACOBY 
 The next paper in the volume, by Sanford M. Jacoby, explores the historical development and 
consequences of progressive discipline in American industry. Jacoby traces the origins of disciplinary 
methods to England during the industrial revolution. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
discipline applied to industrial workers was harsh, “reflecting the employer’s low regard for the worker 
and his work ethic,” according to Jacoby. The English common law supported the employer’s right to 
impose harsh discipline, sometimes including even corporal punishment, on the employees. 
 That common law of employment was imported by the young American nation. Although many 
American employers (for example, the New England textile manufacturers) adopted a paternalistic 
attitude toward their workers, most continued to apply the full range of harsh disciplinary methods. The 
shopfloor system of discipline used in the early textile mills was widely imitated in other industries. By 
the late nineteenth century, the so- called drive system was the common approach to disciplining a work 
force. Under this system the foreman had almost total responsibility for maintaining discipline. As Jacoby 
says, “Foremen relied on a combination of methods to maintain discipline, most of them negative: close 
supervision, fear, profanity, and abuse.” Formal rules of conduct did not exist, so each foreman made up 
his own set of informal rules regulating work behavior. By the late nineteenth century many workers were 
rebelling against the severity and arbitrariness of the drive system. 
 Unions, of course, played a major role in alleviating the worst features of the drive system. 
Leading the way was the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, which in 1910 signed the influential Protocol 
of Peace with the women’s garment industry. The Protocol included a grievance procedure and, although 
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the agreement ultimately fell apart, the innovation was widely copied. In 1911, for example, Sidney 
Hillman gained national prominence when he negotiated a pattern-setting agreement, based largely on the 
Protocol, with Hart, Schaffner and Marx. Under this and other pioneering labor agreements of the day, the 
major principles of progressive discipline were put into place. One feature of the new approach was the 
use of neutral umpires, or arbitrators, to settle unresolved grievances. Most of these neutrals, Jacoby 
notes, “had backgrounds in the Progressive movement and were therefore predisposed to the idea that an 
educated neutral could mitigate industrial conflict, in part by displacing the traditional authority of the 
employer.” 
 The 1920s saw the rise of the personnel department in the American corporation. The paternalism 
of the new personnel managers, the resistance to change of foremen and other line managers, the decline 
of union strength, and the loosening of the labor market all served to slow the pace of disciplinary reform 
during that decade. The pace reaccelerated, however, after the Great Depression, the passage of the 
Wagner Act, and the rise of industrial unionism. In particular, the growth of collective bargaining in the 
1940s and 1950s was accompanied by the incorporation of progressive discipline clauses and grievance 
procedures into labor contracts. Jacoby particularly emphasizes the role of labor arbitration in the 
adoption of progressive disciplinary methods throughout industry. 
 As the author points out, however, differences in the treatment of blue- collar and white-collar 
workers during this later period were substantial. “Although the ‘collar line’ (the income, status, and 
mobility gap between white- and blue-collar occupations) was narrower in the United States than in 
Germany or England, it did, nevertheless, exist.” On the one hand, discipline for the blue-collar worker 
was specified by a “web of disciplinary and work rules” that were uniformly applied. Discipline for the 
white- collar worker, on the other, involved “a more individualized, probing, and less rigid approach.” 
Thus, if meted out at all, discipline for white-collar workers was on an ad hoc basis, and dismissal was 
only a last resort. 
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 In recent years, Jacoby maintains, there has been a “narrowing of the collar line” and 
consequently a convergence in the disciplinary treatment of white- and blue-collar workers. Disciplinary 
procedures for blue-collar workers are becoming more flexible and discretionary, while those for white-
collar workers are becoming more formal and rule-bound. More white-collar employees are now suing 
their employers when they believe they have been dismissed unjustly. Indeed, many of these suits have 
successfully challenged the employer’s right to terminate employees at will. 25 Government regulation 
has also constrained employers in their treatment of white-collar as well as blue-collar workers. As a 
result, employers have begun to formalize the disciplinary procedures covering their nonunion, white-
collar employees. 26 
 At the same time, younger blue-collar workers are less inclined nowadays to accept the 
restrictions on their autonomy imbedded in a rigid disciplinary system. The attitudes of these younger 
workers have been influenced by their higher levels of education, by the lingering effects of the 
“counterculture” of the 1960s, by the diffusion of middle-class norms, and by an elevation in their level of 
aspirations. One “heartening response” to the changing blue-collar attitudes, Jacoby says, has been the 
development of “quality of working life” (QWL) programs. Under OWL programs blue- collar workers 
are allowed to work in autonomous work groups with less direct supervision and fewer and more flexible 
disciplinary rules. 27 
 The irony in this development, Jacoby notes, is that it has been the nonunion firms that have, in 
the main, led the way in creating looser disciplinary systems for blue-collar workers. “Unions still operate 
under a low trust, rules-based system of discipline.... In the past, unionization was often the impetus for 
abolishing the drive system and adopting fairer methods of discipline. But today it is the nonunion sector 
that is the source of innovation in personnel management, including discipline.” If there has been a trend 
toward convergence in the disciplinary treatment of blue- and white-collar employees, Jacoby concludes, 
“it remains to be seen whether unions will be part of that trend, or whether it will bypass them.” 
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 Jacoby’s contribution advances our understanding of the development of progressive discipline in 
American industry. But whether the recent convergence in the disciplinary treatment of blue- and white-
collar employees represents a trend that will continue in the future or only a temporary aberration from 
established practice remains to be seen. 
FIORITO AND GALLAGHER 
 In the final paper of this volume, Jack Fiorito and Daniel G. Gallagher examine the influence of 
job content and job status on unionism. “Since at least Karl Marx’s time,” the authors observe, “job 
content and job status have been recognized as theoretical determinants of unionism. Only recently, 
however, has research in industrial relations begun to explore empirically the effects of these factors, and 
often in only an indirect or incidental manner.” To close this gap in the literature, the authors provide a 
through review of the previous theoretical and empirical literature on job content, job status, and 
unionism and perform their own original empirical analysis. 
 In their review of the literature, the authors point out that most of the empirical research on the 
determinants of unionism does not directly account for the influence of job content and job status. Instead, 
indirect measures, such as those denoting the industry and occupation of the worker, are employed as 
explanatory variables. Only recently have some scholars delved more deeply into the effects of the 
content and status of workers’ jobs on their propensity to join or vote for a union. Some studies, for 
example, have concluded that certain aspects of jobs, such as psychological stress, low promotion 
expectations, and low job autonomy, promote unionism to some extent. 28 But the authors maintain that 
the measures and findings of these previous studies have been inconsistent, leaving the question of the 
precise influence of job content and job status on unionism unresolved. 
 In developing useful measures of job content and job status, the authors seek guidance from the 
disciplines of industrial psychology, organizational behavior, and sociology. Researchers in these 
disciplines have paid considerable attention to the influence of job characteristics on worker attitudes and 
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behavior, but they have not usually been concerned with workers’ propensities to join unions. Some 
research on attitudes and behavior has employed measures of job content based on the Job Diagnostic 
Survey (JDS) developed by Hackman and Lawler and subsequently refined by Hackman and Oldham. 29 
The JDS provides detailed measures of three critical job content dimensions: the meaningfulness of the 
work, the sense of responsibility for work outcomes, and knowledge of results. Sociologists, on the other 
hand, have focused on broader measures of social stratification and hierarchy, employing estimates of 
occupational status such as the Siegel Prestige Scale and the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI). 30 
Other sociologists and behavioral researchers have developed measures of job content from data 
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). 31 Fiorito and Gallagher believe that the use of 
DOT-based measures of job characteristics represents a methodological advance in research on jobs and 
occupations because those measures are based on more objective data than the self-reported responses of 
job incumbents contained in the JDS and because they also contain more detail on the actual content of 
jobs than the Siegel Prestige Scale or the SEI. 
 In the second half of their study, Fiorito and Gallagher conduct an empirical investigation of the 
relationship between alternative measures of job content and job status and two measures of unionism: 
workers’ pro-union voting intent and their actual union membership. The three alternative measures of 
job content and status used by the authors are the self- reported measures of job content contained in the 
Quality of Employment Survey (which are similar to the JDS measures), DOT measures of job content, 
and the Siegel Prestige Scale. They also use more traditional measures of a worker’s occupation and 
industry. Their objective is to compare the relative power of these alternative measures of job content to 
predict workers’ voting intent and union membership. 
 Fiorito and Gallagher test their model primarily by using data on a large sample of worker 
responses contained in the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey (QES). Simple correlations and ordinary-
least-squares (OLS) regressions are used to analyze the data. In the case of their first dependent variable, 
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the results of the authors’ OLS analysis suggest that only the QES measures of job content significantly 
contribute to the explanation of pro-union voting intentions. For example, two QES measures, “role 
conflict” and “high effort levels,” are positively and significantly related to pro-union voting intentions, 
even when the analysis controls for other independent variables. The authors tentatively infer from these 
results that workers in “bad” jobs “perceive unions as a means of improving job content as well as other 
job conditions,” whereas workers in “good” jobs “may view union representation as a threat to that job 
content.” On the other hand, the authors find that the DOT job-content measures and the prestige score 
lose their influence when the analysis controls for other determinants of voting intent. 
 The results of the authors’ analysis of the determinants of union membership suggest that union 
and nonunion jobs differ depending on a variety of job-content and prestige measures. Many of these 
differences, however, dissipate in multivariate analysis. Use of the DOT measures shows that unionized 
jobs involve lower levels of complexity and clerical skills and higher levels of physical activity than do 
nonunion jobs. Use of the QES measures suggests that union members perceive lower levels of autonomy 
and effort in their jobs than nonmembers, but higher degrees of regulation and guidance. Moreover, “the 
regression results indicate that the DOT measures are superior to conventional dichotomous measures of 
industry and occupation in describing membership results.” Although the direction of causality is 
acknowledged to be a problem when worker perceptions are related to union membership, the strength of 
the objective DOT measures suggests that “more than differences in perception” between union and 
nonunion members is involved. 
 In summary, Fiorito and Gallagher warn that “the relationship between job content and voting 
intentions is more complex than the simple notion that workers in what are commonly considered ‘bad’ 
jobs look to unions as the means to change their jobs.” The authors are sensitive to the methodological 
limitations of their study and therefore are cautious in drawing hard-and-fast conclusions. Nevertheless, 
the results of their study do demonstrate that, depending on the particular research question being 
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examined, detailed measures of job and occupational content, as well as measures of status, provide 
additional insights into the determinants of unionism. Fiorito and Gallagher have not succeeded in 
resolving all the anomalies that affect the complex relationship between the content of jobs and the 
propensity of workers to unionize. The authors, however, have provided a solid foundation on which 
future research can be built. 
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